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NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES: SOME WORDS OF
CAUTION
ANDRE A. MOENSSENS*
When, in 1973, in the Preface to the first edition of our book
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, we wrote that "legal proof of crim-
inal conduct is rapidly evolving into a multidisciplinary mosaic of
law, science, and technology,"' the authors did not necessarily fore-
see that the ever-expanding universe of scientific pursuits was soon
to collide with the legal system in some very remarkable ways. Yet, a
few such collisions were already in the making. Even as we reported
in the first edition on the emerging techniques of spectrographic
voice recognition ("voiceprint identification") and on the identifica-
tion of individuals by their bitemarks, battles between law and sci-
ence were already being waged in these disciplines-battles on
which we took differing positions.
Thus, we reported cautiously that spectrographic voice recogni-
tion offered great hope as a novel forensic science, 2 which was
* The author has been a Professor of Law at the University of Richmond since 1973.
This year (1993-1994), he is the visiting William J. Maier, Jr., Professor of Law at West
Virginia University. A specialist in forensic evidence and himself a forensic scientist
since 1950, Professor Moenssens has authored, co-authored, or revised sixteen books on
criminal justice, forensic science topics, and litigation. He is the senior co-author of
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES. Since 1966, he has been a Fellow of the Amer-
ican Academy of Forensic Sciences, and has served two terms as the Academy's secre-
tary-treasurer.
I ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES iii (1st ed.
1973).
2 Id. at 521.
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clearly in doubt by the time the second edition came out.3 Similarly,
in one celebrated case, 4 in which three dentists, one of whom was a
forensic odontologist, 5 identified a bitemark discovered on a vic-
tim's body as having been made by the defendant's teeth and had
their conclusions contradicted by four defense forensic odontolo-
gists6 who not only denied that a positive identification by bitemarks
was possible, but even if it were, that the evidence positively ex-
cluded the defendant as having made the impression, 7 our 1973 edi-
tion suggested that "no published studies exist at the present time
which empirically support" the science of identifying individuals by
their bitemarks. 8 In the second edition, we retained that conclu-
sion,9 though by the time the 1986 edition appeared, the field of
forensic odontology had adopted both the possibility of identifying
human beings by their bitemarks in some cases, and had also de-
3 ANDRE A. MOENSSENS & FRED E. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
583 (2d ed. 1978) ("It does not appear, at this time, that there is a sufficient basis for
accepting either the principle of voice uniqueness or the reliability of the art of compar-
ing speech spectrograms."). The same conclusion was maintained in the 1986 third
edition.
4 People v. Milone, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
5 Forensic odontology is the discipline of dentists interested in forensic identifica-
tions of individuals by their teeth. While dentistry had played a role in forensics as a
means to establish the identity of victims of mass disasters for many years, "forensic
odontology" was recognized as a separate discipline within the American Academy of
Forensic Sciences only in the early 1970s. It was not until 1977 that the Forensic Odon-
tology Section of the Academy formed a "bitemark committee" to engage in research on
the reliability of such a sub-discipline as well as to investigate methods and nomencla-
ture, none of which had previously been submitted for approval to the practitioners in
forensic odontology.
6 One of these defense forensic odontologists was then the president of the Ameri-
can Academy of Forensic Sciences, and was acknowledged by all proponents to be the
scientist with experience in the greatest number of bitemarks cases.
7 See Ailone, 356 N.E.2d 1350. The case was tried in 1973. The appellate court
decision, to the effect that bitemark identification was "generally accepted," was surpris-
ing in the face of sharply conflicting evidence on the reliability of such techniques, and
considering the bitemark in question had been termed "good" by prosecution experts
and "fair to poor" by defense experts. By contrast, the California court in People v.
Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), confronted with evidence of a bitemark
that was exceptionally well defined and with "distinctive teeth characteristics," held that
Frye was not met because no showing had been made that there was indeed an estab-
lished methodology for identifying persons based on bitemarks.
The Frye test of "general acceptance" derives from the case of Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), rejecting the admissibility of the forerunner of our modern
polygraph. The case is discussed in Professor Giannelli's article and other contributions
to this Symposium. The Frye test of "general acceptance" was recently held to be super-
seded by the more liberal admissibility standard of FED. R. EvID. 702, at least for federal
trials. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
8 MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 1, at 582.
9 MOENSSENS & INBAU, supra note 3, at 657-58.
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fined standards for the methodology to be followed.10
A number of thoughts emerge from these few preliminary rumi-
nations. First, all of us, whether in science or in law, have to keep an
open mind and remain ready to change our opinions on an issue
when the developing pace of scientific progress reduces to history
previously held viewpoints. Second, the foregoing examples of
cases in which we first cautiously endorsed a technique that was later
repudiated as scientifically unproven or, conversely, refused to en-
dorse a new method that was later proven to have scientific support,
did not prepare us for the acerbity and viciousness of the new battle
over admission of evidence that was looming on the horizon of the
mid-1980s. Nowhere have battles in and out of the courtroom over
novel techniques been more vociferous than in the area of identify-
ing individuals by their deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA"). Several of
the articles in this Symposium issue explore the path DNA took on
its way through the courts.'1
In the early cases, meaningful challenges to prosecution expert
testimony on the reliability of "DNA fingerprinting" were non-exis-
tent. Courts held prosecution DNA evidence admissible in state af-
ter state. As several of the contributors to this issue chronicle, in a
partial reversal of judicial opinion reminiscent of the "voiceprint"
experience, a slow ground swell of scientific reservations on use of
population statistics resulted in a growing number of more recent
court decisions denying admissibility of the evidence.
But this symposium issue is not just about DNA. Several other
very significant articles on issues and techniques that are currently
the subject of admissibility battles, and some controversy, are in-
cluded for your thoughtful consideration. They span the gamut
from social-behavioral sciences to the physical sciences. Rather
than commenting on the many worthwhile and significant articles
included in this special issue, I would like to suggest an overall
theme that emerges from our experiences in dealing with scientific
evidence for the past three decades: the existing rules of evidence
do not adequately protect the courts from the use of evidence that
has not yet been proven scientifically respectable and acceptable. 12
10 ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 755 (3d ed.
1986) [hereinafter "SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE"].
11 See elsewhere in this issue, the following articles: William Thompson, Evahlating the
Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the 'DNA llar', 84J. GRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993); Peter Neufeld, Have You No Sense of Decency?, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 189 (1993); Rockne Harmon, Legal Criticisms of DNA Typing: Where's the
Beef?, 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1993).
12 This is a theme that many writers have echoed in the past. Among our contribu-
tors, Professor Giannelli is one of the most prominent to have taken this position, as his
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As a consequence of the very recent holding in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,13 which, rather than protecting the fact finding
process from contamination by unreliable expert opinion, may have
actually increased the likelihood of such contamination, especially in
criminal cases, we would like to chronicle some reasons for strong
judicial caution that is not often mentioned in the legal literature.
The Supreme Court in Daubert did not see fit to create distinctions
between proof in criminal versus civil cases, as far as reliability is
concerned, even though literature and case law frequently cautioned
that in criminal cases, where a person's freedom is at stake, courts
ought to be more reluctant to admit evidence based on new, as yet
unproven, techniques when such evidence is being offered by the
prosecution.
Many reasons for such special caution have been mentioned in
the legal literature, and some of the authors in this special issue re-
fer to them, but I would like to briefly mention some reasons that
one does not see often referred to. They have become even more
relevant now that the Court in Daubert did away with the Frye test
and embraced what has been touted as the very loose "general rele-
vancy" test of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. In listing nine differ-
ent reasons for extra caution, I do not in any way seek to create the
impression that I am against scientific evidence or against crime lab-
oratories. I have long advocated the use of scientific evidence in the
truth finding process, and my experiences in forensic science since
the 1950s predate even the start of my legal training in the early
1960s. But the longer one observes the disciplines of the forensic
sciences, the more one has to deal with strongly conflicting emo-
tions. On the one hand, one admires the truly revolutionary new
methods that have been and are being developed. On the other
hand, one remembers some horror stories of the past when too
much haste in rushing new methods through the evidentiary hoops
resulted in convictions on less than sound scientific bases. I urge
caution because its absence is the antithesis of the scientific method;
article references. I have taken the same position on many other occasions. See, e.g.,
Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to Frye, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 545 (1984), and other references in SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE, supra note 10, at
5-13.
Wholesale abandonment of the Fye test in federal trials as a result of the United
States Supreme Court's Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993), decision, is likely to lessen that protection even further. This author will show in
a writing soon to be published that Daubert is not likely to improve the chances of admit-
ting novel scientific evidence in those courts that previously followed Frye.
13 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993); see supra note 7.
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lack of caution leads to grievous error that tends to bring forensic
science into disrepute.
I. MOST EXPERT WITNESSES ARE TECHNICIANS
Most of the witnesses who testify as experts for the prosecution
are not truly scientists, but better fit the label of "technicians." 1 4
While their testimony as experts in areas well recognized by reliable
precedent is entirely proper, they are not the type of witnesses
needed to lay an adequate foundation for new scientific develop-
ments that they used, but did not empirically validate. More and
more, the courts are coming to recognize that, when dealing with
novel scientific issues, the foundation for admissibility and the fact
of general scientific recognition "may not be established without the
testimony of 'disinterested and impartial experts,' 'disinterested
scientists whose livelihood was not intimately connected with the
new technique.' "15
Nothing pejorative or negative is intended by the label "techni-
cian." These technicians are perfectly competent to use techniques
validated by others, and properly apply them to obtain perfectly reli-
able results. They are not, however, the kind of experts that lawyers
need in an attempt to make new law by being among the first to
introduce novel expert testimony in court.
Also, some evidence examiners who qualify readily as experts
nevertheless do not understand the sophisticated instrumentation
that is used in crime laboratories. They have been taught to use the
complex instruments, such as the infrared spectrophotometer, or
14 Most crime laboratory personnel will immediately disagree with this statement be-
cause they have been bestowed with the job title of "forensic scientists." It is in the
definition of "scientist" where the misunderstanding lies. A scientist does empirical re-
search. Starting with a theory that is postulated, the scientist then experiments to verify
the validity of the theory. If the theory is not disproved after a searching inquiry and
empirical testing, then comes the time to devise and build an instrument or develop a
technique that will permit the theory to be applied practically in a forensic setting. If
this stage is reached, the scientist conducts more tests to show there is a positive correla-
tion between the results and the underlying theory, to demonstrate whether the effects
observed are truly the result of the new technique or whether they are caused by some
other, unidentified, event. These steps are not always followed in crime laboratory "re-
search." It is not the kind of endeavor that can be easily accomplished in crime labora-
tories, understaffed as they are, and able to cope with an ever increasing case load only
by increasing the "turn-around" time.
15 See People v. Tobey, 257 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Mich. 1977) (dealing with "voiceprint"
identification). In a similar case, People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976), the Califor-
nia Supreme Court said that acceptance of a technique by a limited group of individuals,
mostly connected with law enforcement, whose impressive credentials were those of
technicians and police officers, not scientists, did not demonstrate the kind of "general
acceptance" needed to validate a new technique.
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the gas chromatograph, or a whole host of other delicate scientific
apparatus or even "simple" breathalyzers, as "bench operators"
who have only a superficial understanding of what the instrument
really does, and how the read-out is generated. Again, it is entirely
proper for these witnesses to testify in connection with their use of
instrumentation in techniques that have been demonstrably vali-
dated in the past by true researchers and scientists, but such "bench
operators" who qualify as expert witnesses are not competent to ex-
plain the instrumentation used unless it is established that they re-
ceived the training and education necessary to impart a thorough
understanding of the underlying theories.
II. PRO-PROSECUTION BIAS MAY IMPAIR SCIENTIFIC IMPARTIALITY
This special issue demonstrates that even where crime laborato-
ries do employ qualified scientists, these individuals may be so im-
bued with a pro-police bias that they are willing to circumvent true
scientific investigation methods for the sake of "making their
point." Witness the examples cited of shameless circumvention of
the peer review process in publishing DNA articles.' 6
Unfortunately, this attitude is even more prevalent among some
"technicians" (non-scientists) in the crime laboratories, for whom
the presumption of innocence disappears as soon as police investi-
gative methods focus on a likely suspect. These individuals, who are
frequently trained to do forensic work on the job after obtaining an
undergraduate degree in chemistry or biology, are bestowed with
the job title of "forensic scientist" after only a short time in their
crime laboratory function. Their pro-police bias is inconsistent with
being a scientist. In fact, the less of a scientific background a lab
person has, the less critical that person is likely to be in terms of
investigating the validity of claims made by other laboratory person-
nel. These are the "experts" who typically jump on the bandwagon
of anything new that comes down the pike, and will staunchly advo-
cate its reliability, even in the absence of any objective investigation
and validated experimentation.
Again, many of these individuals do good work in the field in
which they have been trained, but their bias is often so strongly pro-
prosecution that they may lack the kind of objectivity and dispas-
16 See Neufeld, supra note 11, at 192-97. I have documented elsewhere attempts by
law enforcement experts to stifle dissent by writing to defense lawyers and judges in
cases where the defense sought to retain expert witnesses. These attempts involved
discrediting potential witnesses' qualifications extra-judicially and blocking admission to




sionate judgment that one expects of a true scientist, be it forensic
or otherwise.
III. EXPERTS TESTIFY BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF THEIR EXPERIENCE
Expert witnesses notoriously stray outside the fields of their ex-
pertise. It should be recognized, however, that frequently this is not
the expert's fault because lawyers often ask questions on issues be-
yond the witness's experience. The opposing attorney then fails to
object because neither lawyer knows any better! This problem is
caused by the appalling scientific illiteracy that exists among the bar
and bench. 17 Juries largely share the scientific illiteracy of the legal
profession. Horror stories illustrating these concepts abound.
"With the backing of 'expert' testimony from a doctor and police
department officials, a soothsayer who decided she had lost her
psychic powers following a CAT-scan, persuaded a Philadelphia
[civil] jury to award her [one] million [dollars]."' 8
This scientific illiteracy causes lawyers to sometimes blindly ac-
cept opinions as accurate because they are believed to be based on
immutable scientific principles when, in fact, they are the purest of
"evaluation" and opinion. ' 9 Justice Hawkins, dissenting in Hooten v.
17 See, e.g., James Starrs, In the Land of Agog: An Allegory for the Expert Witness, 30 J.
FORENSIC Sci. 289 (1985).
[L]awyers as a group evidence an appalling degree of scientific illiteracy, which ill
equips them to educate and guide the bench in its decisions on admissibility of
evidence proffered through experts. This scientific illiteracy is shared by a large
segment of the trial and appellate bench; many judges simply do not understand
evidence based on scientific principles; even more tragically, they overlook impor-
tant attributes indicative of reliability of evidence they reject, while ascribing posi-
tive properties to other evidence they accept which that evidence simply does not
possess.
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 10, at 7 (footnote omitted).
18 Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, FORBES, July 8, 1991, at 68. The same
article quoted Donald Elliott, general counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency,
as saying that the law "extends equal dignity to the opinions of charlatans and Nobel
Prize winners, with only a lay jury to distinguish between the two." Id.
It should be noted that Huber's article, which in its expanded version became the
book GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991), has itself been criti-
cized strongly, as mentioned in Professor Giannelli's article in this issue. Paul Gianelli,
''Junk Science:" The Criminal Cases, 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 107 (1993). One
reviewer scolded Huber for being a purveyor of junk science himself. See Jeff Lewin,
Calabresi's Revenge?Junk Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183 (1992).
19 When confronted with their "mistake," such lawyers then begin to mistrust all
experts and treat them with contempt. Much of the disenchantment between lawyers
and scientists results from a mutual lack of understanding of the wide differences in
approaches used by "scientists" when seeking to solve problems they face in their disci-
plines, and the method used by the law when a dispute ends up in court for judicial
resolution. See generally Noreen L. Channels, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS IN THE LEGAL
PROCESS (1985); J.D. Nyhart & Milton M. Carrow, LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION
(1983). See also Charles W. Ehrhardt, The Conflict Concerning Expert Wlitnesses and Legal Con-
1993]
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State,2 0 commented that it was "an astonishing indictment on the
gullibility of lawyers and judges" that an incompetent person could
qualify as an expert in over three hundred cases! 2 1 It is largely this
scientific illiteracy of lawyers that permits experts to stray beyond
their fields of competence, even where they do have a recognized
expertise in a given field.
What forensic pathologist, frequently called upon to deal with
gunshot wounds, isn't asked questions regularly about the caliber
and characteristics of weapons, even though the pathologist is not
trained in firearms identification?2 2 By the same token, what fire-
arms examiner isn't asked regularly about wounds resulting from
firearms handling? In one case, a qualified examiner was asked
whether red marks that he had observed on the shoulder of an ar-
restee could have come from the recoil of a rifle. 23 What qualifies a
firearms examiner to give an opinion on bruises and contusions on
clusions, 92 W. VA. L. REv. 645 (1990); J.D. Nyhart & Thomas F. Jones, What You Don't
Know About Technology Can Hurt You, 69 A.B.A.J. 1667 (1983); Thomas Nace, Expert Evi-
dence-Gropingfor Consensus in Science and Law, TRIAL, Sept. 1992, at 59. For a basic expla-
nation of scientific methodology, see Stephanie E. Busloff, Comment, Can Your Eyes Be
Used Against 1ou?-The Use of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test in the Courtroom, 84J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 203 (1993).
20 492 So. 2d 948, 958 (Miss. 1986) (Hawkins,J., dissenting). The case involved the
admissibility of the testimony of a graphoanalyst (a person attempting to discover the
character of a person from handwriting-purportedly scientific application of graphol-
ogy) testifying as a questioned document examiner on an issue of disputed authorship.
The graphoanalyst-witness vaunted in Hooten that she had never "bothered to read any
books on forensic document work, said she did not intend to, and already knew all she
needed to know," thus exemplifying, inJustice Hawkins' words, "the one sure sign of a
quack: contempt for recognized authorities." Id. (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 958 (Hawkins,J., dissenting). The appalling fact that graphologists without
training in scientific questioned document examination succeed in hoodwinking the
legal profession is further exemplified by the fact that the respected publisher of the
multi-volume PROOF OF FACTS recently commissioned the writing of the new chapter on
questioned document examination-handwriting identification, to a graphoanalyst, Dor-
othy Lehman, who lacks standing in the field of forensic document examiners. See 15
AM. JUR PROOF OF FACTS 3d Handwriting Identification (1992). The new chapter is sup-
posed to supersede the previous POF article on the topic, written with the assistance of a
highly respected questioned document examiner, James V. P. Conway. For commentary
on and a perspective review of the POF graphology contribution by a former California
crime laboratory director, see DuayneJ. Dillon, Graphology's Revenge: 4 Review of 'Ques-
tioned Document Examination-Identification of Handwriting on Document', Sc.
SLEUTHING REV., Winter 1992, at 7-11. The reviewer's conclusion that the PROOF OF
FACTS article contains a "magnitude of erroneous information" is all the more appalling
if one considers that most trial lawyers consult PROOF OF FACTS regularly to prepare
their cases!
22 In Lee v. State, 661 P.2d 1345, 1354 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), the court allowed a
forensic pathologist to testify on bullet caliber from a gunshot wound examination be-
cause this was within the expert's area of "professional experience."
23 See People v. Lauro, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503, 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
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the human body? Again, this testimony was not objected to!24
In another case, the state's chemist, who was not a pharmacolo-
gist, was allowed to testify that LSD makes one do all kinds of bi-
zarre things, like it "made people go as far as to tear out their eyes
right out of their sockets, chew off an arm, jump out of windows."' 25
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, but not because the opinion
was beyond the training of the chemist-which it clearly was-but
because the testimony was irrelevant to the charge of possession of
LSD. 26
It is clearly the lawyer's job to know the limits of an expert's
field of training in order to avoid permitting incompetent evidence
into the trial record, and to assure the proper and timely objection
can be made. In a DNA case, a defense attorney introduced into
evidence a survey conducted by members of the American Society of
Crime Laboratory Directors, which asked them if they felt that the
work done by the three commercial companies in that field-
Lifecodes, Cellmark, and Forensic Science Associates-was ready
for casework (and presumably for admissibility). These crime labo-
ratory directors' qualifications were never looked into; few of them
were molecular biologists or geneticists; few of them were intimately
familiar with what these laboratories were actually doing and had
accomplished. 27
IV. EXPERT WITNESSES PREVARICATE ON THEIR QUALIFICATIONS
Some experts blatantly misstate and exaggerate their qualifica-
tions, to the point of perjury-a great embarrassment to the lawyers
who called them as witnesses and, perhaps unknowingly, allowed
perjurious statements to be used. This is true of state and federal
government, as well as defense, witnesses. Many otherwise qualified
experts bestow academic degrees upon themselves that they did not
earn, including doctorates. Some profess to have worked in prestig-
ious laboratories in which they never set foot!28 The reported cases,
24 Id.
25 Smith v. Commonwealth, 292 S.E.2d 362, 363 (Va. 1982).
26 Id. at 364.
27 See Letter to the Editor, 34 J. FORENSIC Sci. 803, 803 (1989). Now that the crime
laboratories have adopted the methods of these companies and, sometimes with simpli-
fied protocols, are duplicating their work, these same crime laboratory directors have
had to do a quick about-face.
28 For a veritable catalogue of some clearly documented cases including FBI and po-
lice crime laboratory "experts," see James E. Starrs, M1lountebanks Among Forensic Scientists,
in 2 FORENSIC SCIENCE HANDBOOK (Richard Saferstein ed., 1988). Examples include a
phony "Dr." Milton Kline, who testified as an expert around the country, and most nota-
bly in the Ted Bundy murder prosecution in Florida. David Twedell, after having
19931
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in all likelihood, expose only the tip of an iceberg. Since busy law-
yers do not routinely verify every entry in an expert's lengthy re-
sume, most of the imposters were discovered only accidentally.2 9
One wonders how widespread the problem is. A superficial glance
at discovered cases leads us to believe that the falsification of cre-
dentials is truly a problem of national proportions. It has probably
come about because experts have for so long been used to getting
away with saying almost anything, since they knew lawyers did not
verify credentials. In fact, crime laboratories ordinarily do not verify
or check the accuracy of the statements made by their employees in
the course of court testimony.
Again, to a large extent, this may be termed a failure of the
legal profession to challenge expert statements routinely. Some ca-
reer experts, who became part-time career witnesses, discover after
years of testifying that neither the direct nor the cross examiners
understand most of what they say, or only pretend to understand,
and do not meaningfully challenge their statements. In time, the
feeling grows that they can get away with saying almost anything on
the witness stand. These experts certainly do not view "maximiz-
ing" of their qualifications with what they consider minor exaggera-
tions to be very significant, as it does not go to the substance of their
professional work.
We should by no means conclude that the entire forensic sci-
ence profession is suspect. Obviously, that is not so. The vast ma-
jority testify truthfully, but the "mountebanks" are entirely too
common to suggest that the chance of running into one of them is
remote.
V. PROFICIENCY TESTING OF CRIME LABORATORIES: A SURPRISE
Experts and crime laboratories did not fare well in proficiency
testing conducted by their own professional organization. In the
flunked out of the University of Houston, claimed to have a doctorate in geology from
that school when he applied forjobs and when he testified as a government expert in the
infamous Love Canal litigation. FBI Special Agent Thomas N. Curran claimed, under
oath, to have a master's degree in science when he never attained any graduate degree.
According to an internal FBI inquiry, Curran also committed perjury in testifying about
tests he had conducted at the FBI laboratory and reported results of tests he had never
conducted. Starrs, in Mountebanks, lists many other instances of defense and prosecution
witnesses who "maximized" their educational and experience credentials.
29 Kline's fake doctorate was not discovered until prosecutors in the John Lennon
murder trial found his name on the list of defense witnesses and recalled that in an
earlier court appearance Kline had listed, among his credentials, having been a "mem-
ber of the Visiting Teaching Faculty of Forensic Hypnosis at the FBI Academy in Quan-
tico, West [sic] Virginia."
[Vol. 84
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mid-1970s, Forensic Sciences Foundation, Inc., on behalf of the
American Academy of Forensic Sciences and crime laboratory direc-
tors, organized a national proficiency testing program based on vol-
untary participation. The unstated but avowed purpose of the
program was to establish that crime laboratories were highly compe-
tent,30 but the results were disappointing. For example, 71.2% of
the laboratories obtained "unacceptable results" in blood typing,
34% could not match paint samples, and 50% could not identify
dog hairs.3 1
Before overestimating the importance of this study as it applies
to today's laboratories, it should be stressed that the results of this
early proficiency test do not represent the state of affairs that exists
today. As may well be imagined, the Forensic Science Foundation
proficiency test was a real bombshell that caused a lot of soul-
searching and induced laboratories to undertake widespread quality
control improvements. Today, we clearly could not make the
across-the-board statement that "crime laboratories flunk analysis,"
as one director said in those days.3 2 Serious errors of the type noted
would be rare exceptions in 1993.
Yet, when it comes to "novel" techniques, caution is indicated
because our technological advances continue to leap forward at an
ever increasing rate, and the laboratories have been hard pressed to
keep up. Who ever heard, in the 1950s, of HLA, or enzymes and
proteins in blood analysis of crime scenes, or of DNA fingerprint-
ing? Who ever dreamed of the sophisticated techniques and instru-
mentation that are now routinely used in crime laboratories, such as
atomic absorption spectrophotometry, ion microscopy techniques,
the scanning electron microscope, and gas chromatography with ion
capture detection? These techniques and/or instruments did not
even exist in the fifties, or, if they existed, they were not routinely
used in forensic work.
The disciplines of forensic odontology, which gave birth to the
still somewhat controversial bitemark identification process, and fo-
rensic anthropology, had not yet been organized as discrete bodies
of scientists within the American Academy of Forensic Sciences.
Even the disciplines that were already common in the early crime
laboratories have grown exponentially in their capabilities. When
30 This author is a past officer of the Academy, and was, by virtue of that fact, a
member of the Foundation during some of the time that the proficiency testing project
was undertaken.
31 See SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 10, at 5-7.
32 Donald Mooney, President's Address at the Annual Meeting of the International
Association for Identification (July 1978).
1993]
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we thought of questioned document analysis in earlier days, we were
basically talking about handwriting and typewriting analysis. Today,
document examiners still do that work, but their expanded horizons
now also encompass sophisticated ink analysis techniques, analysis
of paper and writing instruments, as well as examination of docu-
ments produced by microcomputer assisted word processing and
their assorted laser, ink jet, dot matrix, and other printers.
Fingerprint techniques, among the oldest identification means
still used by law enforcement today, have become far more sophisti-
cated than they once were. Rather than just dusting with fingerprint
powder and using iodine fuming and silver nitrate processing, as
was done less than half a century ago, latent print searches now rou-
tinely use ninhydrin development, laser techniques, and cya-
noacrylic ester fuming. Traditional classifying and filing is largely
supplanted by automated filing and searching.
Crime laboratories themselves have grown from just a few
dozen well equipped facilities in the late forties and early fifties to
literally several hundred well equipped federal, state, and local labo-
ratories. From a few hundred individuals who frequently testified as
experts in forensic analysis, the field has now grown to literally
thousands and the numbers grow daily. With this expansion of
techniques, and the simultaneous growth in the numbers of places
of research, we cannot ignore the fact that crime laboratories today
have a great deal of difficulty staffing the many technical functions
they are asked to perform. In most laboratories, there are openings
at the benches and no qualified applicants for the jobs. Laborato-
ries are forced to train individuals with only a minimum of academic
credentials (an undergraduate degree) to perform sophisticated
analyses and operate complex instrumentation. 33
VI. HUMAN ERROR A MORE IMPORTANT FACTOR
THAN PREVIOUSLY SUSPECTED
In part because of the growth in the forensic sciences outlined
above, there are more and more cases coming to light where some
properly trained examiners, all of whom refer to themselves as fo-
rensic "scientists," have simply reached erroneous conclusions.
Misidentifications have even occurred in disciplines as old and
widely used as fingerprint identification. 34 Which leads us to the
33 See Randolph Jonakait, Forensic Sciences: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 109, 109-116 (1991); Jay A. Siegel, The Appropriate Educational Background for Entry
Level Forensic Scientists: A Survey of Practitioners, 33J. FORENSIC SCI. 1065 (1988).
34 See, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982) (new trial ordered be-
cause the uncontroverted testimony of the state's fingerprint expert subsequently dis-
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next logical question: how often is this likely to happen? We don't
really know! Most of these documented cases have come to light
only by accident, or after a particularly tenacious investigator re-
vealed them. The reality of life being what it is, mistakes of this kind
are not very likely to be discovered.
Because, among the great mass of criminal litigation, only a lim-
ited number of cases of documented error have come to light, we
deduce therefrom that errors are rare. But that is not a very scien-
tific conclusion or deduction. Some cynics may well suggest that the
reason we do not discover errors more often is because criminal de-
fendants rarely have the funds to conduct a meaningful challenge by
hiring their own experts. The critics argue that if the results ob-
tained by police experts were checked every time, a lot of mistakes
would be discovered. Whether that is true is impossible to verify.
What is currently being discovered, however, is that a number
of convictions have been based on erroneous eyewitness identifica-
tion and/or erroneous traditional serology-type testimony. Ironi-
cally, it is the now beleaguered DNA technique that is said to
establish the innocence of persons convicted by other, previously
well established and widely accepted, scientific evidence.
There is no question that the impact of statistical calculations
on the probability of an innocent match in blood analysis has a great
impact on the jury. If a serologist testifies that the blood sample
taken from a defendant's clothing matches that of the victim's
blood, and that the probability of these same characteristics occur-
ring in the blood of human beings is only one in 20,000, then, in the
mind of the fact finder, identity has been established with as much
definitiveness as science can muster. Surely, considering that viable
suspects of the crime must often be limited to a smaller population
group than the statistics allow for, the reasonable juror may be led
to believe there is no possibility of error.
Yet, exactly the opposite seems to be coming to light in the re-
covered to have been incorrect). Id. at 574. For commentaries on that case, see James
Starrs, To Err Is Human, Infallibility Is Divine, ScI. SLEUTHING NEWSL., Jan. 1983, at 1;
James Starrs, A Miscue In Fingerprint Identification: Causes and Concerns, 12 J. PoL. SCI. &
ADMIN. 287 (1984); George Bonebrake, Fabricating Fingerprint Evidence, IDENTIFICATION
NEWS, Oct. 1976, at 3 (listing 15 cases of fabricated fingerprint evidence). See also SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 10, at 461-62 n.113 (discussing the DePalma case, popular-
ized in the READER'S DIGEST, in which a "fake" latent print remained undetected by
other highly qualified experts).
These errors are, of course, not confined to the field of fingerprint identification.
For example, an odontologist identified certain marks on a body as bitemarks consistent
with those of the defendant's teeth until it was established by other forensic experts that
the marks were post mortem abrasions without any resemblance to bitemarks. SeeJames
E. Starrs, SCL SLEUTHING REV., Spring 1992, at 5.
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testing, by DNA analysis, of the evidence in cases where persons had
been previously convicted on eyewitness testimony or on traditional
serology testimony. What may be gathered from the mounting evi-
dence is that the statistical inferences drawn from serological "iden-
tifications" of the defendant as the perpetrator appear to have been
accepted as proof of a uniqueness that is simply not warranted.
Despite protestations of innocence and an alibi, Leonard Cal-
lace was convicted of rape in 1986 and sentenced to twenty-five to
thirty years to Dannemora prison, in New York. His accuser identi-
fied him and the jury believed her. Not until July of 1992 would
Callace succeed in having the victim's blue jeans tested by DNA.
"The DNA left on the girl's clothing and the DNA of Leonard Cal-
lace were not the same," said Attorney Thomas McVann. 35
In April of this year, Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder, fear-
ing a miscarriage ofjustice, ordered the immediate release and par-
don of Walter T. Snyder, Jr., convicted in 1986 of the rape of a
neighbor in Alexandria.3 6 John E. Klock, Alexandria's common-
wealth attorney, concurred in the petition for Snyder's release. At
Snyder's trial, which resulted in a conviction and a forty-five year
sentence, the victim had identified him. He also had reputedly con-
fessed several times to police, and a serologist testified that glandu-
lar material taken from the scene was "consistent with" Snyder's
secretion type.37 His lawyer, Peter Neufeld,38 is reported to have
said at the time of Snyder's release that there have been ten cases
nationally in which "DNA has exonerated a suspect." 39 Since about
thirty-five to thirty-seven percent of all DNA tests performed at the
request of police clear the individuals whose DNA samples are sub-
mitted as suspects, this is likely to be a misquote. We can assume
that Neufeld said that ten persons previously convicted of offenses
were later cleared by a DNA retest of the evidence used to obtain an
earlier conviction.
There are other well-documented cases already on the record.
In 1979, an Illinois court sentenced Gary Dotson, who had stead-
fastly protested his innocence, to twenty-five to fifty years for the
rape of a sixteen-year-old girl. Six years later, the victim, accompa-
nied by her husband, at a press conference and before television
35 Michael Ryan, Is D. Testing Foolproof? PARADE MAGAZINE, Apr. 25, 1993, at 10.
36 See Michael Hardy & Jamie C. Ruff, Wilder Pardons Rape-Case Inmate, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1993, at AL.
37 Mike Allen, Wilder Asks Review of Rape-Case DA Test, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Apr. 19, 1993 at Al.
38 Peter Neufeld is a contributor to this issue. See Neufeld, supra note 11.
39 Hardy & Ruff, supra note 36, at A8.
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cameras, stated that she had never been raped and that she had
never seen Gary Dotson-her complaint had been a panicked reac-
tion to a fear she was pregnant. The physical evidence produced at
trial and the deductions made therefrom by experts-torn clothes,
bruises, cuts on her vagina and abdomen-were all self-inflicted.
Despite the public outcry demanding Dotson's release, the judge
who conducted the hearing decided that the "victim's" exoneration
of Dotson was not credible, and he ordered Dotson remanded to the
penitentiary. According to a commentator, "the firestorm of news
media and public pressure" compelled Illinois Governor James R.
Thompson "to conduct an extraordinary expanded clemency hear-
ing," at the conclusion of which he "agreed with the judge's ruling
but nonetheless freed Dotson 'under the circumstances.' "40 It was
only after a re-testing of the physical evidence by DNA that Dotson's
innocence was established.4 '
Harmon mentions a recent West Virginia case, 42 in which a per-
son convicted on traditional serological evidence was later cleared
and freed when DNA testing established that he could not have
been the perpetrator. As science progresses in one area (DNA), it
seems to impeach or cast doubt on the worth of another technique
(serology) that has benefitted from long judicial acceptance.
VII. USE BY EXPERTS OF FRAUDULENT OR MANUFACTURED
EVIDENCE
On rare occasions, highly qualified experts have been shown to
40 Edwin Black, Why Judge Samuels Sent Gary Dotson Back to Prison, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1985, at 56.
41 Free at Last, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 19. In contrast to the cases in which DNA
proof of innocence resulted in reversals, in at least one rape prosecution, the jury con-
victed the defendant based on the victim's eyewitness identification despite proof by an
FBI expert that DNA analysis positively excluded the defendant as the semen donor. See
State v. Hammond, 604 A.2d 793 (Conn. 1992) (cited in ScI. SLEUTHING REV., Summer
1992, at 14-15).
42 See Harmon, supra note 11, at 188. He refers to Woodall's case wherein the de-
fendant's conviction for rape was set aside because the (former) state police serologist,
Fred Zain, had identified Woodall as the rapist but six nationally renowned forensic
scientists later called Zain's test results "impossible." Zain left his job in West Virginia
to become a serologist for the Bexar County Medical Examiner in Texas, where he was
fired just a few months ago because he had changed his testimony there, too! In a crimi-
nal trial for murder, he had identified two large blood spots on the victim's carpet as
"belonging to the defendant." Later, in the course of a civil proceeding stemming from
the victim's death, he testified that the blood stains were the victim's. See Stephanie
Martz, Ex-state Serologist Leaves TexasJob, THE CHARLESTON GAZETrE, July 28, 1993, at IA.
See also, Judge to Eye Zain's Cases, CHARLESTON GAZE'rE, June, 4, 1993, at 1A (reporting
the appointment of a retired circuit court judge by the State Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia to head an investigation into the alleged police lab misconduct).
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have manufactured evidence with which innocent individuals were
"framed" and convicted. 43 One recent case reported that a police
officer was convicted of official misconduct for falsifying
breathalyzer readings and extorting money from fifteen people he
detained on the basis of the falsified readings. 44 In another case, a
pathologist for about forty counties in Texas was shown to have
faked several hundreds of autopsies. 45
On the Sunday, March 28, 1993, CBS program, 60 Minutes, a
segment focused on David Harding, a fingerprint expert of the New
York State Police who falsely testified to having found suspects' fin-
gerprints at crime scenes in five cases and thus secured convictions.
Are these isolated occurrences? Initially, the reaction of the New
York State Police was that this was a lone crook, until, according to
CBS, Harding also implicated Crime Scene Investigator Robert Lis-
chansky of the State Police as having faked finding fingerprints at
43 See SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 10, at 461 for references to at least 15 cases of
fabricated fingerprint evidence that came to the attention of the FBI Identification Sec-
tion. Other such instances are also reported in Starrs, supra note 28. Thomas Curran, a
special agent in the FBI Laboratory's serology unit at the time of his resignation, re-
ported the results of lab tests he did not in fact conduct. In one case, he testified that
the defendant and the victim both had type 0 blood, but on retesting it appeared the
defendant had type B blood. Other mistaken or false evidence was discovered in his
case files. Delbert Lacefield, director of a forensic toxicology laboratory operated by the
Federal Aviation Administration, pled guilty to falsely reporting drug test results which,
in fact, had not been performed. Dennis Michaelson was an "expert" in arson investiga-
tions who testified in civil cases for insurance companies and in criminal cases for the
State of Illinois. In at least two cases where he testified as a prosecution expert, he
found evidence of arson when no such evidence existed. The Illinois Supreme Court
placed responsibility for failing to verify Michaelson's credentials, about which he had
also lied, on the prosecution, despite its ignorance of the expert's perjury. See People v.
Cornille, 448 N.E.2d 857 (Ill. 1983).
Last year, a state police evidence technician falsely testified to having found defend-
ant's fingerprints at a crime scene. His "find" was confirmed by another investigator. In
the summer of 1992, the police evidence technician admitted that he had faked the evi-
dence, and had done so in several cases! Larry Kutz, Guest Editorial-A Mill Stone, Not a
MVile Stone, 43 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 1 (1993). On experts who lie, see Susan M.
Kuzma, Criminal Liability for Misconduct in Scientific Research, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 357
(1992); Carol Garcia, Expert Witness Malpractice?, EXPERT EVIDENCE REP., June 1990, at
267; Carol Garcia, Expert Witness Malpractice: A Solution to the Problem of the .Vegligent Expert
Witness, 12 Miss. C. L. REV. 39 (1991); James Starrs, The .Misbehaving Expert-The Law
Turns Turtle, SCI. SLEUTHING REV., Spring 1993, at 1.
44 State v. Gookins, 621 A.2d 968, 969-70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. granted sub
nom., State v. Falcone, 627 A.2d 1150 (NJ. 1993).
45 Richard L. Fricker, Pathologist's Plea Adds to Turmoil, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 24.
The subheading declares, "Discovery of possibly hundreds of faked autopsies helps de-
fense challenges." The concluding sentence read: "We don't know how many people
were unjustly convicted on this guy's testimony .... Obviously we need to take some
affirmative action. We don't know but what some innocent person was executed based
on his testimony." Id.
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crime scenes in seventeen cases. 46 Then, when Harding also accused
his supervisors, a state police spokesman interviewed on 60 Minutes
admitted that if the supervisors were not directly involved, they
were certainly guilty of failing to be aware of what was going on
under their noses.
Lapses in honesty are, of course, not confined to crime labora-
tories. For example, in late 1992, the Richmond, Virginia, newspa-
per published stories about a private laboratory that is regularly
asked to perform thousands of tests on water, air and soil samples
for industries, military bases and homeowners to check for a variety
of pollutants. These test results were then submitted to state agen-
cies as proof of compliance with environmental regulations. It came
to light that this laboratory had either falsified test results or not
performed tests and fabricated the results out of thin air. State offi-
cials characterized this practice as potentially one of the largest envi-
ronmental crimes in the state. After state and federal agents raided
the laboratory and seized ninety-three boxes of paperwork, and dur-
ing the weeks of investigation that followed, the laboratory contin-
ued as if nothing had happened! 47
Again, we cannot generalize and suspect all forensic scientists
of sinister motives. I am convinced that the forensic disciplines are
peopled with basically honest and straightforward, competent, ex-
perts. But that belief may lull us into a false sense of security. We
are of course tempted to say, "it could never happen here" or "our
people are not like that." The lawyers, judges, and department
heads in all of the above cases probably believed the same thing,
until the opposite was established in a court of law. And these are
just some of the cases that have come to light.
The temptation to fabricate or to exaggerate certainly exists.
All experts are tempted, many times during their careers, to report
positive results when their inquiries came up inconclusive, or indeed
to report a negative result as positive when all of the other investiga-
tive leads seem to point to the same individual. Experts can feel
secure in the belief that their indiscretions will probably never come
to light. Not all succumb to that temptation; in all likelihood most
46 Lischansky is listed in the current membership directory of the prestigious Inter-
national Association for Identification, the leading professional group of fingerprint ex-
perts.
In a news item, a third former member of the same police unit, a lieutenant, was
reported to have been sentenced for faking fingerprint evidence. See Former State Police
Official Sentenced in Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1993, at B8.
47 Mark Johnson, Problem at Laborator Corrected, Lawyer Says, RICHMOND TIMES-DIs-
PATCH, Dec. 20, 1992, at B 11; Alan Cooper, Man in Lab Case Turns Himself in-V1anager is
Accused of Falsifying Reports, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 4, 1993, at BI.
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never do. The "system," however, certainly makes it possible for
this to occur, because in many laboratories throughout the United
States, an expert's opinion on a piece of evidence is not verified by
other experts, unless she asks for such verification herself.
VIII. PROBABILITIES EVIDENCE OF DOUBTFUL RELIABILITY
Statistical estimates of the value of the expert's conclusions, if
admitted in evidence, are usually terrific from the standpoint of the
prosecutor, because estimates makes it appear that the odds are as-
tronomical against the expert making a mistake and accusing the
wrong person. These statistical estimates have been used freely as
part of blood grouping evidence, and are also beginning to be used
widely in hair comparison cases. Most other disciplines in the foren-
sic sciences have some statistics available, and are beginning to sug-
gest some uses for them, but the serologists and hair comparison
experts-microanalysts-are the forensic persons who have been
the least restrained in their use of statistics.
We have heard it said that you can always interpret statistics to
justify any conclusion. That is most certainly an overstatement in
forensic science, but the plain fact is that statistics are bandied about
frequently in a totally irresponsible way. Experts use statistics com-
piled by other experts without any appreciation of whether the data
base upon which the statistics were formulated fits their own local
experience, or how the statistics were compiled. Sometimes these
experts, trained in one forensic discipline, have little or no knowl-
edge of the study of probabilities, and never even had a college level
course in statistics.
There have been some highly celebrated cases wherein evi-
dence of statistical probabilities was of great importance in securing
the conviction. Perhaps the most prominent is the Wayne Williams
murder prosecution for two of the thirty killings of black males in
Atlanta. The contested scientific evidence in that case involved fiber
analysis. This evidence was critical not only in connecting Williams
with the two homicides with which he was charged, but also in con-
necting him with ten other killings, proof of which was introduced as
"other acts" evidence. Although the admissibility of fiber evidence
was not a novel issue, the method used by the prosecution in its
attempt to show the uniqueness of the fiber evidence was new. In an
article published after the trial, an FBI expert who testified at the
trial wrote: "To convey the unusual nature of the Williams residen-
tial carpet, an attempt was made to develop a numerical
probability-something never before done in connection with tex-
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tile materials used as evidence in criminal trials." 48
I Although the defense expected to confront fiber evidence, it is
not clear that they expected the evidence to be presented in statisti-
cal form. There is no way that they could have been prepared to
challenge this evidence without prior knowledge of the foundational
basis for the probability figure. The defendant did move for pretrial
discovery of scientific reports. As anyone who has ever seen an FBI
laboratory report would know, these reports would not necessarily
indicate that statistical evidence would be presented. Yet, the pros-
ecution's evidence appeared devastating. According to the dis-
sent,49 the prosecutor argued that there was only a 150 million
probability that any other Atlanta household had the same type of
bedroom and automobile floorboard carpets. 50 No meaningful de-
fense challenge was offered.
The plain fact is that experts widely use statistics and probabili-
ties testimony without proper validation of the underlying data.
Most forensic experts who use these statistics have no idea of how
the calculations were made, and are not statisticians themselves.5 '
After a whirlwind acceptance of DNA by the first appellate courts to
confront DNA analysis evidence, including the probability studies
that attempt to calculate the odds against a false match, some courts
have become more cautious. This caution is not necessarily based
on the legitimacy of DNA analysis (which is universally accepted),
but of the use on the statistical inferences drawn therefrom, as is
explored in several articles in this issue.52 The early rush to admis-
sibility was sparked in large measure by the fact that the experts tes-
tifying about their analytical results were truly research scientists
with doctoral degrees and impeccable educational credentials. They
were employed by the private laboratories that pioneered the novel
technique. The gloss began to fade as the technology transfer from
research laboratories to crime laboratories began, and expert wit-
nessds became somewhat less credentialed, and also began to
change (sometimes shortcutting) operating protocols to improve
48 Harold A. Deadman, Fiber Evidence and the Wayne Williams Trial, FBI L. ENFORCE-
MENT BULL., May 1984, at 13.
49 Williams v. State, 312 S.E.2d 40, 92, 96 (Ga. 1983) (Smith, J., dissenting).
50 Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
51 Use of what has been called "trial by mathematics" is discussed in SCIENTIFIC EvI-
DENCE at chapters six (blood tests) and eight (hair comparisons). See also LeonardJaffee,
Of Probativity and Probability: Statistics, Scientific Evidence, and the Calculus of Chance at Trial,
46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 925 (1985); Craig Callen, A Brief Word On the Statistical Evidence Debate,
66 TUL. L. REv. 1405 (1992) (referring to several other recent sources).
52 See supra note 11.
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the "turn-around" time of evidence handling.53
Statistical evidence is powerful in its impact, but lawyers have
an obligation to carefully scrutinize its applicability when offered, to
avoid irresponsible use of evidence that is often presented merely
for what it does not purport to do: convince the jury that they can
convict, secure in the knowledge that error is humanly impossible.
IX. "EXPERTS AREN'T DOING ANALYSIS .... COMPUTERS ARE!"
Some years ago, after a meeting of the Virginia Laboratory Ad-
visory Board, on which I served for eight years, I met with the then
Director of the State Bureau of Forensic Sciences who was about to
retire. I asked him to tell me what he, in his experience, saw as a
possible weakness of crime laboratory testimony in court. He said:
"computers!" Computers are a little bit like statistics to crime labo-
ratory people-they use them all the time, but they do not necessar-
ily know how they work.
Many computer-assisted determinations in the crime laborato-
ries use programs that were produced outside the laboratory. The
data bases upon which the programs were fashioned were also com-
piled outside the laboratory. The users do not know exactly what is in
the data base, other than the description given in the literature that
came with the disks or the reels, or the data bases are one-line but
located and compiled elsewhere.
Yet, more and more of these programs are being relied on to
identify substances, especially in the drug field. In order to run an
analysis, you do not need to be an expert anymore-you only need
to be taught to run a sophisticated type of instrumentation that is
hooked up to a computer, and then to read off the result. This retir-
ing crime laboratory director told me, "Sometimes I wonder
whether we are doing an analysis, or whether the computer is doing
it. We're losing control over the analysis process and are giving it
up to some program inside the box that we know nothing about,
except in a very general sense." 54
While I am not aware of any cases wherein this has been chal-
53 This trend was predicted at least two years before it became evident, in Andre
Moenssens, DNA Evidence and Its Critics-How Valid Are the Challenges?, 31 JURIMETRICS J.
87 (1990). A recently released report of the National Academy of Sciences, entitled
DNA Technology in Forensic Sciences, endorses the reliability, in principle, of DNA analysis,
but questions the reliability of some laboratories and the undisciplined use of statistics.
See Don J. DeBenedictis, DNA Report Raises Concerns, A.B.A. J., July 20, 1992, at 20. See
also Neufeld, supra note 11, and Harmon, supra note 11, in this issue.
54 Personal conversation with WarrenJohnson, Former Director of the Virginia State
Bureau of Forensic Science. See also David H. Kaye, Computer Decision .1laking for the Expert
Wl'itness, EXPERT WITNESS J., Jan. 1991, at 19.
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lenged, or caused problems, it is something that lawyers should be
concerned about. Clearly, there is a fundamental change taking
place in the way crime laboratories obtain their results, a change
that has not yet been adequately scrutinized by the law.
X. CONCLUSION
Opinion testimony by experts is extremely potent when han-
dled properly. Novel scientific theories have an almost irresistible
appeal. To handle such evidence competently, and to properly chal-
lenge its admissibility when its use is believed to be unwarranted,
will require the legal profession as a whole to become more scientifi-
cally informed and astute. The articles in this special issue intro-
duce you to critical analyses of several novel areas in the law of
scientific evidence.
